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Fiduciary Standards and Best Interests: Should States
Take the Lead?
I. INTRODUCTION
The appropriate standard of care for investment professionals in
the United States has evolved since the passage of the Securities
Exchange Act (“Exchange Act”) 1 and the creation of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in 1934. 2 The federal government, in an
attempt to shield the public from potential conflicts of interest in the
investment advisory business, enacted two pieces of legislation in 1940
to take aim at the issue: 3 the Investment Company Act of 1940 4 and the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 5 Thirty-four years later, as the federal
government sought to establish protections for the retirement savings of
millions of Americans, 6 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (“ERISA”) was passed. 7 Contained within ERISA are provisions
that describe what qualifies an individual as a “fiduciary” 8 and the duties,
liabilities, and responsibilities that flow from that designation. 9 A
1. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2018).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2018); U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, LAWS THAT GOVERN THE

SECURITIES
INDUSTRY
(2013),
https://www.sec.gov/answers/aboutlawsshtml.html#invadvact1940 [https://perma.cc/T6ZG-6UTP].
3. See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 2 (listing the federal statutes enacted
over the last century to regulate and govern the securities industry).
4. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2018).
5. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2018).
6. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION, FACT SHEET:
WHAT IS ERISA, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resourcecenter/fact-sheets/what-is-erisa [https://perma.cc/7JLG-MA42] (describing the goals and
importance of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).
7. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–
1461 (2018).
8. See Fiduciary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining the term to mean
“a person holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to that of a trustee, in
respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good faith and candor
which it requires”).
9. ERISA § 1002(21)(A) (laying out the events that trigger a fiduciary duty, including
the control or management of retirement plan assets, rendering of compensated investment
advice, or administration of a plan); § 1104(a)(1) (requiring a fiduciary to act for the sole
benefit of the participants and beneficiaries of the retirement plan, to keep expenses
reasonable, and to act in a prudent manner by diversifying plan assets and acting in conformity
with the plan documents); § 1105(a) (discussing actions that could bring liability on one acting
as a fiduciary to a retirement plan); § 1106 (prohibiting certain transactions between the
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fiduciary, for the purposes of ERISA, must provide advice for the sole
interest of the retirement plan participant. 10
From the passage of ERISA in 1974 until 2010, very little was
done to alter the government’s views and interpretations of the proper
standards of care that should apply to advisers working with retirees. 11
However, in the wake of the Great Recession, Congress decided that it
was time to reexamine the standards of conduct that applied to
professionals involved in the financial advisory business. 12 As part of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank”), 13 Congress mandated that the SEC complete a study that would
address concerns over the “obligations of brokers, dealers, and
investment advisers,” as well as the regulatory environment in the
financial advisory industry. 14 Many of the concerns that triggered
heightened scrutiny of the industry stemmed the from the events
surrounding Bernie Madoff 15 and the failure of the regulatory system in
place at the time to protect investors from such predatory schemes. 16
Specifically, the SEC study was to examine “the standards of care for
brokers, dealers, investment advisers . . . and persons associated with
investment advisers for providing personalized investment advice about
securities to retail customers that should be addressed by rule or
statute.” 17 The study recommended that the SEC promulgate a uniform
retirement plan itself, the fiduciary to the plan, and the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the
plan).
10. JOHN TOPOLESKI & GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44207, DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR’S 2015 PROPOSED FIDUCIARY RULE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 4 (2016).
11. See generally Dawn Reiss, ERISA: Why the Fiduciary Rule Is Not a New Idea, U.S.
NEWS
&
WORLD
REP.
(Oct.
11,
2017,
11:28
AM),
https://money.usnews.com/investing/investing-101/articles/2017-10-11/erisa-why-thefiduciary-rule-is-not-a-new-idea [https://perma.cc/XV2R-PUR4] (discussing how the views
of the public and the federal government regarding the protection of retirement plans have
evolved since the passage of ERISA).
12. See BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41350, THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY 22 (2017)
(detailing how Congress came to decide that it needed to scrutinize the regulatory framework
for investor protection).
13. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
14. Dodd-Frank § 913(b), 124 Stat. at 1824.
15. See Amir Efrati, Tom Lauricella, & Dionne Searcey, Top Broker Accused of $50
ST.
J.
(Dec.
12,
2008,
11:59
PM),
Billion
Fraud,
WALL
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122903010173099377
[https://perma.cc/HR4Q-YWX5]
(describing the allegations surrounding Madoff and his securities firm).
16. WEBEL, supra note 12, at 22.
17. Dodd-Frank § 913(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 1824.
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fiduciary standard that would be applicable to both investment advisers
and to broker-dealers. 18 The SEC has never acted on this specific
recommendation. 19
Questions over the scope and reach of the fiduciary standard led
the Department of Labor (“DOL”) in 2010 to propose a rule that took aim
at conflicts of interest for financial advisers providing guidance to
investors on retirement accounts. 20 However, due to push back from the
financial industry, the proposed reform of the fiduciary interpretation was
delayed until 2015, at which time the DOL proposed a revised version of
the rule. 21 The final DOL “fiduciary rule,” 22 issued in April 2016, was a
culmination of years of political and policy debate over who should be
subject to a fiduciary standard and how the standard would be applied
moving forward. 23
With the election of Donald Trump in 2016, the fate of the
fiduciary rule was thrown into question, as speculation mounted that the
incoming Trump Administration would seek to either delay or completely
repeal the fiduciary rule. 24 That speculation was confirmed in February

18. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISORS AND BROKERDEALERS 101 (2011).
19. WEBEL, supra note 12, at 22.
20. See Stephen Miller, DOL Issues New Proposed Rule on Investment Advice, SHRM
(Feb.
26,
2010),
https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/hrtopics/benefits/Pages/AdviceRuleRedux.aspx [https://perma.cc/3TJR-9PTN] (describing the
2010 rollout of the Obama Administration’s proposed changes to the standards governing
retirement plan advisers).
21. See Janet L. Luxton & Gene Paranczak, Regulatory Brief: The Final DOL Fiduciary
Rule: What It
Means to Plan Sponsors,
VANGUARD (Aug.
2016),
https://institutional.vanguard.com/iam/pdf/FIDRULPA.pdf?cbdForceDomain=false
[https://perma.cc/3D2Z-3GP5] (analyzing the newly released fiduciary rule).
22. Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary’’; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20946, 20946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pts. 2509, 2510, 2550).
23. See Ian Salisbury, A Huge Change Is About to Hit Wall Street, MONEY (Apr. 6, 2016),
http://money.com/money/4281293/fiduciary-rule-standard-retirement/
[https://perma.cc/H2ZR-C2DF] (looking at the path to the fiduciary rule and some of the early
reactions from Wall Street and consumers).
24. See Anthony Scaramucci, Your 401(k) Doesn’t Need a Federal Babysitter, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 1, 2016, 7:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/your-401-k-doesnt-need-a-federalbabysitter-1478042244 [https://perma.cc/NR4L-KWXN] (discussing Scaramucci’s criticisms
of the fiduciary rule); Sarah N. Lynch, Retirement Plan Offered by Trump Pick Puzder Sheds
Light on Labor Rule, REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2016, 2:51 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-trump-fiduciary/retirement-plan-offered-by-trump-pick-puzder-sheds-light-on-laborrule-idUSKBN13Y2GS [https://perma.cc/ND7U-T5RP] (speculating on prospective
Secretary of Labor Andy Puzder’s views of the fiduciary rule).
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2017 when President Trump issued an executive order 25 instructing the
DOL to review the fiduciary rule and perform an updated economic and
legal analysis of its impact. 26 The Trump Administration followed the
executive order by repeatedly delaying the implementation of the
fiduciary rule 27 until March 2018, when the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the fiduciary rule in its entirety. 28
The DOL, then headed by a Trump appointee, declined to defend the
fiduciary rule further and appeal the Fifth Circuit’s ruling to the United
States Supreme Court. 29 Consequently, the ultimate fate of the Obamaera fiduciary rule seemed to be sealed. 30
The demise of the fiduciary rule triggered a series of new
governmental actions across numerous agencies at both the state and
federal levels. 31 Most significantly, the SEC issued a new package of
investor protection regulations, which effectively equated to a revision of
the federal fiduciary rule. 32 Several states also proposed or implemented
new rules governing the standards which investment professionals must
adhere in their business with clients. 33 This new combination of
competing regulations, in addition to the lingering confusion from the

25. Memorandum on the Fiduciary Duty Rule, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 95 (Feb.
3, 2017), reprinted in 82 Fed. Reg. 9675, 9675–76 (Feb. 7, 2017).
26. Id.
27. Jim Pavia, Trump Delays Controversial Fiduciary Rule for Advisors, CNBC (Feb. 3,
2017, 1:37 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/03/trump-delays-controversial-fiduciaryrule-for-advisors.html [https://perma.cc/6JXP-8LUT]; Lisa Beilfuss, Labor Department
Seeks 18-Month Delay in Fiduciary Rule, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2017, 5:23 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/labor-department-seeks-18-month-delay-in-fiduciary-rule1502305970 [https://perma.cc/T2LW-939B].
28. U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 388 (5th Cir.
2018).
29. Tara Siegel Bernard, Obama-Era Investor Protection Rule is Dead, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 2018, at B3 (“The department did not try to defend the rule after the appeals court’s initial
decision, experts said, and it let a deadline pass to petition the Supreme Court to hear the
case.”).
30. See id. (discussing the demise of the fiduciary rule in the federal courts).
31. See Sarah O’Brien, SEC’s New Investor Protection Rule Won’t End the Fiduciary
Debate, CNBC (July 30, 2019, 8:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/30/sec-newinvestor-protection-rule-wont-end-the-fiduciary-debate.html [https://perma.cc/J4LZ-3Z97]
(“The multi-tentacled tug-of-war [over investor protection laws] is likely to persist.”).
32. Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg.
33318, 33318 (July 12, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
33. John Manganaro, State-Based Fiduciary Regulations Take Shape in 2019,
PLANADVISER (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.planadviser.com/exclusives/state-basedfiduciary-regulations-take-shape-2019/ [https://perma.cc/NPE4-9SQG].
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fiduciary rule’s brief existence, has produced a significant amount of
uncertainty in the investment advice industry. 34
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part II delves into the portion of
ERISA that deals directly with the fiduciary standard and how it
originally applied to financial advisers. 35 Part III reviews the Obama
Administration’s fiduciary rule, its rationale, and the reaction to the rule
from industry and consumer advocates. 36 Part IV analyzes the new SEC
rules package, the early reaction to it, and its potential fate as a result of
pending litigation. 37 Part V examines the patchwork of state regulations
that have arisen in the past few years. 38 Part VI concludes by
recommending that the federal government rethink its level of
involvement in the regulation of the financial advisory industry. 39
II. THE ORIGINAL FIDUCIARY STANDARD SET FORTH IN ERISA
When the Obama Administration announced in 2015 that it
intended to promulgate a new investor protection rule, the Administration
singled out ERISA and its outdated provisions, 40 pointing to the seismic
transformation that had taken place in America’s retirement system since
the law’s passage in 1974. 41 Under ERISA, a person is deemed to be a
fiduciary regarding a retirement plan if he or she maintains any direct
control over the management, disposition, or administration of the plan’s
assets or “renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation” 42
regarding the plan and its assets. 43 The DOL responded to the passage of
ERISA by implementing a five-part test to determine whether or not a

34. John Manganaro, Fog Still Hangs Over Defunct DOL Fiduciary Rule’s Influence,
PLANADVISER (June 25, 2019), https://www.planadviser.com/fog-still-hangs-defunct-dolfiduciary-rules-influence/ [https://perma.cc/4R93-QVSD].
35. See infra Part II.
36. See infra Part III.
37. See infra Part IV.
38. See infra Part V.
39. See infra Part VI.
40. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §
1002(21)(A) (2018) (setting forth ERISA’s criteria to qualify as a fiduciary).
41. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Middle Class Economics: Strengthening
Retirement Security by Cracking Down on Backdoor Payments and Hidden Fees (Feb. 23,
2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/23/fact-sheet-middleclass-economics-strengthening-retirement-security-crac [https://perma.cc/4A6Q-5KDE].
42. ERISA § 1002(21)(A).
43. Id.
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person had, in fact, provided “investment advice” for the purposes of
triggering the fiduciary standard of care. 44
First, a person must have provided advice or recommendations
regarding securities or other appreciable property. 45 Second, that person
must have provided the necessary type of advice on a “regular basis.” 46
Third, the advice must have been rendered in accord with an
understanding between the fiduciary and the person seeking advice. 47
Fourth, the advice provided must have served as the “primary basis for
investment decisions” regarding the plan assets. 48 Finally, the advice
must have been individualized for the participant in the plan. 49 The last
four prongs of the test confused financial professionals and investors
alike for decades. 50 The second and fourth prongs were the two
components that were the most heavily targeted by the fiduciary rule. 51
At the time of ERISA’s passage, the dominant retirement savings
vehicle in the United States was the defined benefit pension plan. 52 In
these types of retirement plans, the employer sponsors the plan, bears the
risk of the plan’s investment returns, and promises the participants in the
plan either a fixed dollar amount per pay period or an amount to be
determined through a plan formula. 53 Over time, however, the retirement
market experienced a vast swing to defined contribution plans, 54 in which
44. Susan P. Serota & Kathleen D. Bardunias, Take Two: DOL Reproposes Changes to
Definition of Fiduciary for ERISA Plans and IRAs, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN
(May
8,
2015),
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/images/content/6/5/v2/65729/AdvisoryMay2015ECBTakeT
woDOLReproposesChangestoDefinitionofFiduc.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQK8-EEDG].
45. Definition of “Fiduciary,” 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(j)(1)(i)(A) (West 2017).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(j)(1)(i)(B)(2) (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. See generally David C. Kaleda, Department of Labor’s Proposal to Define
“Investment Advice,” THE INV. LAW., Oct. 2015, at 1 (examining the sections of ERISA which
the fiduciary ruled aimed to change).
51. See Serota & Bardunias, supra note 44 (discussing the changes to the “regular basis”
and “primary basis for investment decisions” prongs).
52. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §
1002(35)(B) (2018) (defining defined benefit plans “as a pension plan other than an individual
account plan and . . . [one that] shall be treated as an individual account plan to the extent
benefits are based upon the separate account of a participant and as a defined benefit plan
with respect to the remaining portion of benefits under the plan”).
53. U.S.
DEP’T
OF
LABOR,
TYPES
OF
RETIREMENT
PLANS,
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/retirement/typesofplans [https://perma.cc/7578-SAGB].
54. See ERISA § 1002(34) (defining defined contribution plans as “a pension plan which
provides for an individual account for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the
amount contributed to the participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses,
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the employee bears the investment risk of the plan’s assets and will
ultimately have at his or her disposal only the assets in his or her
particular account in the plan, not a promised amount from the
employer. 55 In 2012, it was estimated that nearly 70% of private-sector
retirees held their assets in these defined contribution plans, up from 26%
in 1975. 56 It was this shift in retirement savings vehicles, in addition to
the explosion of growth in the number of retirees using the Individual
Retirement Account (“IRA”) 57 that formed the basis for the Obama
Administration’s efforts to alter the investment advisory regulatory
landscape. 58
III. THE FIDUCIARY RULE
On February 23, 2015, President Obama delivered a speech to the
AARP 59 in which he expressed his desire for the DOL to change federal
regulations to require financial advisers to place the needs of their clients
before the advisers’ own financial interests. 60 Obama pointed to the need
to take aim at incentives provided to financial advisers by their
employers, such as backdoor payments and hidden fees. 61 On the same
day, the Council of Economic Advisers released an economic analysis
and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such
participant’s account”).
55. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 53.
56. TOPOLESKI & SHORTER, supra note 10, at 12.
57. Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2018) (“[T]he term ‘individual
retirement account’ means a trust created or organized in the United States for the exclusive
benefit of an individual or his beneficiaries . . . .”).
58. See TOPOLESKI & SHORTER, supra note 10, at 12 (pointing to the $17 billion lost by
IRA investors per year due to conflicted investment advice and lack of regulatory safeguards).
59. The AARP, formally known as the American Association of Retired Persons, is an
interest group whose stated mission “is to empower people to choose how they live as they
age.” About AARP, AARP, https://www.aarp.org/about-aarp/ [https://perma.cc/2YBVCZGT] (last visited Jan. 6, 2020).
60. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President at the AARP (Feb. 23,
2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/23/remarkspresident-aarp [https://perma.cc/J7HK-36XJ] (“If you are working hard, if you’re putting
away money, if you’re sacrificing that new car or that vacation so that you can build a nest
egg for later, you should have the peace of mind of knowing that the advice you’re getting for
investing those dollars is sound, that your investments are protected, that you’re not being
taken advantage of . . . There are a lot of very fine financial advisors out there, but there are
also financial advisors who receive backdoor payments or hidden fees for steering people into
bad retirement investments that have high fees and low returns. So what happens is these
payments, these inducements incentivize the broker to make recommendations that generate
the best returns for them, but not necessarily the best returns for you.”).
61. Id.
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titled “The Effects of Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement
Savings,” supplying data in support of the Obama Administration’s push
to rewrite the rules governing financial advice. 62 The study’s key
findings were that, due to conflicted advice, retirees experienced roughly
a 1% reduction in investment returns and added costs of $17 billion. 63
The report focused in particular on the IRA market and the lower
regulatory standard for investment professionals when providing advice
on how to execute IRA rollovers. 64 An IRA rollover is the process by
which an investor moves his or her retirement account from either an
employer-sponsored retirement plan or an existing IRA into a new IRA. 65
Because the IRA rollover is a one-time financial transaction, the advice
rendered regarding the rollover did not meet the “regular basis” prong of
the 1975 regulations. 66 By extension, this meant that financial advisers
who provided guidance on IRA rollovers were not subject to a fiduciary
standard of care. 67
In response to the request from President Obama, on April 6,
2016, then-Secretary of Labor Tom Perez announced the completion of
the fiduciary rule. 68 Two days later, the final rule was published in the
Federal Register. 69 The remainder of this Part examines the main

62. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE EFFECTS OF
CONFLICTED
INVESTMENT
ADVICE
ON
RETIREMENT
SAVINGS
(2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_coi_report_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZJM9-KA2X] [hereinafter CEA REPORT].
63. Id. at 2.
64. Id. at 3 (“The average IRA rollover for individuals 55 to 64 in 2012 was more than
$100,000; losing 12 percent from conflicted advice has the same effect on feasible future
withdrawals as if $12,000 was lost in the transfer.”).
65. Julia
Kagan,
IRA
Rollover,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/ira-rollover.asp [https://perma.cc/97XE-LNE2] (last
updated Apr. 29, 2019).
66. Brad Campbell & Joshua Waldbeser, Old Standard, New Day: The Death of the
Fiduciary Rule Doesn’t Mean That Broker-Dealers Won’t Be Fiduciaries, DRINKER BIDDLE
& REATH (May 22, 2018), http://www.brokerdealerlawblog.com/2018/old-standard-newday-the-death-of-the-fiduciary-rule-doesnt-mean-that-broker-dealers-wont-be-fiduciaries/
[https://perma.cc/45A2-Y2TV].
67. Id.
68. See Melanie Waddell, Perez: Final DOL Fiduciary Rule Includes Big Changes to
Deadlines,
BICE,
THINKADVISER
(Apr.
6,
2016,
2:10
AM),
https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2016/04/06/perez-final-dol-fiduciary-rule-includes-bigchange/ [https://perma.cc/T448-LWRS] (detailing the final fiduciary rule’s provisions and
scheduled implementation date).
69. Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary’’; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20946, 20946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pts. 2509, 2510, 2550).

2020]

FIDUCIARIES AND BEST INTERESTS

249

changes that were to be made to existing federal law under the fiduciary
rule.
A.

Replacement of the “Five-Part Test” to Qualify as a Fiduciary

Instead of laying out required actions that must be taken for an
adviser to trigger the fiduciary standard of care, the fiduciary rule set forth
a list of investment-related actions which, if committed in exchange for a
fee or commission, would qualify as “investment advice” and subject the
adviser to the fiduciary standard. 70 With a few exclusions, 71 any
recommendation regarding the acquisition, holding of, or disposal of
investment property or securities and how investment property or
securities should be rolled over, transferred, or taken out of an employersponsored retirement plan or an existing IRA would constitute investment
advice. 72 In addition, any recommendations regarding the actual
investment strategy, asset allocation, portfolio makeup, or selection of
type of investment account, along with how an existing IRA should be
managed for planning purposes, would be considered investment
advice. 73
The fiduciary rule also required that the person providing the
advice have either (a) represented himself as a fiduciary under the ERISA
or the Internal Revenue Code, (b) provided the advice in accord with an
oral or written agreement or an understanding that the advice was
provided to help the individual needs of the plan participant, or (c)
directed tailored advice to a participant in relation to assets contained
within a retirement plan or IRA. 74
B.

Exceptions to Actions That Would Ordinarily Trigger Fiduciary

70. See TOPOLESKI & SHORTER, supra note 10, at 8–9 (2016) (providing a list of activities
that would and would not trigger the fiduciary standard of care).
71. See Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary’’; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20972 (listing exclusions such as assistance provided by
platform providers such as assistants to fiduciaries; general communications between advisers
or their companies and clients, such as newsletters or television programs; and most forms of
investment education provided to clients).
72. See Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary’’; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20948 (listing forms of advice that qualify as investment
advice for purposes of the fiduciary rule).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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Status
If an investment adviser had any communication with a person
the fiduciary rule deemed to be a “counterparty,” 75 then the adviser was
permitted to proceed under the reasonable belief that these types of
sophisticated financial professionals would be able to make the
investment decisions discussed on their own. 76 Another exemption to
fiduciary status occurred when an adviser provided advice regarding
swaps and derivative dealings, in accordance with certain procedures. 77
Finally, the fiduciary rule exempted employees of retirement plan
sponsors or their affiliates who offered advice to fiduciary advisers or
plan participants from qualifying as fiduciaries themselves, provided they
did not receive any additional compensation for their advice. 78
C.

The Best Interest Contract Exemption

The component of the fiduciary rule that generated considerable
debate among academics 79 and heightened scrutiny from the financial
industry as a whole was the “best interest contract prohibited transaction
exemption” (“BIC Exemption”). 80 The BIC Exemption allowed financial
advisers to make recommendations that could potentially violate a
fiduciary standard if specific regulatory requirements were met. 81 This
exemption was included to provide broker-dealers a way forward in the
75. See id. (providing that the list of carved out counterparties included “broker-dealers,
registered investment advisers, banks, insurance companies . . . or plan fiduciaries who have
at least $50 million under management”).
76. See id. (“At the same time, however, as the Department acknowledged in the
proposal, the broad test could sweep in some relationships that are not appropriately regarded
as fiduciary in nature . . . .”).
77. See id. at 20985 (listing the requirements to avoid being deemed a fiduciary in a swap
transaction to include the person not be acting as the adviser to the subject plan, there must
be an “independent plan fiduciary” representing the plan, etc.).
78. See id. at 20986 (defining the scope of the employee/affiliate exception).
79. See generally Quinn Curtis, The Fiduciary Rule Controversy and the Future of
Investment Advice (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series 2018-04,
2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3121708
[https://perma.cc/2QTP-M3GE] (arguing that the BIC Exemption is flawed in its design).
80. See Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary’’; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20946–47 (introducing the BIC Exemption).
81. See id. at 20991 (“[The BIC Exemption] require[s], among other things, that
investment advice fiduciaries adhere to certain Impartial Conduct Standards, which are
fundamental obligations of fair dealing and fiduciary conduct, and include obligations to act
in the customer’s best interest, avoid misleading statements, and receive no more than
reasonable compensation.”).
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changing regulatory environment. 82 Because broker-dealers, unlike
investment advisers, 83 conduct business on a transaction-by-transaction
basis, they had previously not fallen under the 1975 regulations that
imposed a fiduciary duty on the financial professionals who did satisfy
the five-prong test. 84
The BIC Exemption required that financial institutions
“acknowledge fiduciary status for itself and its Advisers.” 85 The BIC
Exemption imposed upon institutions several additional requirements
when dealing with retirees: (1) prudent advice in the best interest of the
retiree; (2) charging reasonable compensation; (3) a promise to avoid
making misleading statements concerning the investments; (4) the
implementation of policies to discourage violations of the required
standards of conduct; (5) the avoidance of improper incentives for
financial representatives; and (6) the fair disclosure of all relevant
information surrounding advice. 86
The acknowledgment of the
requirements must be in writing prior to any advice or recommendations
being made. 87 Crucially, the BIC Exemption provided a private remedy
for IRA investors, 88 which created a legal right of action against financial
82. See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. and Fin. Advisors (“NAIFA”), The Best
Interest
Contract
Exemption
(June
2015),
https://www.naifa.org/NAIFA/media/GovRel/issuefed/The-Best-Interest-ContractExemption.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR8R-WDTS] (“The BIC exemption, while intended as a
way to allow continuation of the broker-dealer/registered representative model for providing
investment advice . . . .”); Ryan Fuhrmann, Suitability vs. Fiduciary Standards: What’s the
Difference?,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/professionaleducation/11/suitability-fiduciarystandards.asp [https://perma.cc/RAQ6-Z4YN] (last updated Sept. 9, 2019) (describing how
the suitability standard, the prior standard to which broker-dealers were held differs from the
newly imposed fiduciary standard).
83. See Pete Woodring, Know the Difference Between a Broker and a Registered
Investment
Adviser,
KIPLINGER
(Sept.
22,
2015),
https://www.kiplinger.com/article/investing/T023-C032-S014-the-difference-between-abroker-and-an-adviser.html [https://perma.cc/K934-4PSN] (discussing how investment
advisers such as Registered Investment Advisers (RIAs) generally offer a broader array of
services to consumers, such as investment, insurance, education, and retirement planning and
are usually compensated in the form of a fee based on the amount of assets under his or her
management).
84. See Campbell & Waldbeser, supra note 66 (describing the shifting regulatory
environment for broker-dealers under the fiduciary rule).
85. Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21002, 21003 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
86. Id. at 21007.
87. Id. at 21003.
88. Id. at 21008; see Joshua Waldbeser & Jamie Helman, The DOL’s Best Interest
Contract Requirement: Effect on Litigation Against Broker-Dealers, DRINKER BIDDLE &
REATH (Oct. 28, 2017), http://www.brokerdealerlawblog.com/2017/dols-best-interest-
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advisers and institutions in the event that the BIC Exemption was
allegedly violated. 89
D.

Reactions to the Fiduciary Rule

There was a wide disparity in the reaction to the proposed and
final fiduciary rules, both on Capitol Hill and between pro-consumer 90
and pro-business groups. 91 Senator and 2020 presidential candidate
Elizabeth Warren, one of the fiercest proponents of the fiduciary rule,
pointed to what she perceived as the main source of conflicted advice
being given to investors by financial advisers: kickbacks, prizes, bonuses,
and other awards offered by financial services companies that would be
triggered by the advisers’ meeting such things as sales quotas and
benchmarks. 92 Warren asserted that the fiduciary rule would force the
financial industry to stop these practices and to stop hiding these potential
rewards for advisers deep in the pages of product prospectuses. 93 She
believed that, without government intervention, the industry would not

contract-requirement-effect-litigation-broker-dealers/
[https://perma.cc/J9T8-J6R5]
(describing how ERISA-covered plans did not require anything like the BIC Exemption
because there are already legal remedies for breach of fiduciary duties in those plans).
89. Waldbeser & Helman, supra note 88.
90. See Darla Mercado, How the New ‘Fiduciary’ Rule Will Actually Affect You, CNBC
(Oct. 13, 2016, 10:33 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/13/how-the-new-fiduciary-rulewill-actually-affect-you.html [https://perma.cc/4RGC-BRLS] (“‘The Department of Labor
has done what the Securities and Exchange Commission is unable to do: create an enforceable
best interest standard and rein in conflicts that aren’t in the best interest of the investor,’ said
Barbara Roper, director of investor protection at the Washington, D.C.-based Consumer
Federation of America.”).
91. See Tim Devaney, Chamber Waging Lobbying Battle Over Investment Rule, THE
HILL (Mar. 7, 2016, 3:24 PM) https://thehill.com/regulation/labor/272079-chamber-waginglobbying-battle-over-investment-rule [https://perma.cc/ZFS4-BMHA] (looking at the
concerted effort led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to fight back against what it perceived
as negative effects of the fiduciary rule).
92. OFFICE OF SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN, VILLAS, CASTLES, AND VACATIONS:
AMERICANS’ NEW PROTECTIONS FROM FINANCIAL ADVISER KICKBACKS, HIGH FEES, &
COMMISSIONS
ARE
AT
RISK
4
(2017
ed.),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2017-2-3_Warren_DOL_Rule_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G4RA-UZ29] (“The Conflict of Interest Rule put in place by DOL will put
a stop to these harmful kickbacks. The new rule prohibits financial firms from compensating
their advisers in ways that encourage and reward them for making recommendations that are
not in their clients’ best interest.”).
93. Id.
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end these practices on its own. 94 Many of her fellow Democratic
politicians shared her favorable views of the fiduciary rule. 95
On the other hand, Republicans held much more skeptical views
of the fiduciary rule. 96 Then-Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee,
Orrin Hatch, echoed his Republican colleagues in voicing concern that
the fiduciary rule would force financial advisers into an environment with
higher compliance costs and reduce the number of choices in advisers and
investment products that would be available to everyday investors. 97
These assertions were mirrored by financial advisers who, under the new
regulations, were placed at a greater risk of class-action litigation. 98
Advisers were also concerned that, with the forced move away from
commission-style payments, which the Obama Administration viewed as
generating conflicts of interest, 99 small investors would be effectively
forced out of the market for financial advice because a fee on an account
with a small investable balance would not be worth an adviser’s time and
energy. 100
94. Id.
95. Bobby Scott, Maxine Waters, & Elijah Cummings, Time to Curb High Fees on

Retirement
Accounts,
CNBC
(Apr.
14,
2016,
10:45
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/14/time-to-curb-high-fees-on-retirement-accountscommentary.html [https://perma.cc/CYR6-A6VT] (discussing commentary by Bobby Scott,
Maxine Waters, and Elijah Cummings, members of the U.S. House of Representatives and
the top Democrats on the committees on Education and the Workforce, Financial Services,
and Oversight and Government Reform, respectively).
96. Representative Phil Roe (R-TN), the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions stated the following: “[The] new regulatory
scheme will hinder access to retirement advice for low- and middle-income families and make
it harder for small businesses to help their employees plan for retirement . . . .” Melanie
Waddell, GOP Fights to Block DOL Fiduciary Rule, THINKADVISOR (Apr. 19, 2016, 9:21
AM),
https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2016/04/19/gop-fights-to-block-dol-fiduciaryrule/?t=riasrefchannel-more-news [https://perma.cc/D2AF-QDMT]. Representative Ann
Wagner (R-MO) stated the following: “[The new rule] hurts those it claims to protect: lowand middle-income families who are looking for sound investment advice in the midst of a
savings crisis. The unquestionably flawed rule raises costs, limits choices and restricts access
to investments for hardworking Americans.” Id.
97. Press Release, Office of Senator Orrin Hatch, Hatch Statement of DOL Fiduciary
Rule (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/hatch-statement-ondol-fiduciary-rule [https://perma.cc/45J9-PCWZ].
98. See Liz Skinner, The DOL Fiduciary Rule Will Forever Change Financial Advice,
and the Industry Has to Adapt, INVESTMENTNEWS (June 9, 2016, 11:34 AM),
https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160509/FEATURE/160509939
[https://perma.cc/874B-E7D9] (describing the potential litigation facing advisers under the
fiduciary rule).
99. CEA REPORT, supra note 62, at 2.
100. Brad Allen, Advisers Do the Math on Fiduciary Rule Compliance, STARTRIBUNE
(Apr. 29, 2017, 2:00 PM), http://www.startribune.com/advisers-do-the-math-on-fiduciaryrule-compliance/420548943/ [https://perma.cc/X4JD-SRT3] (“[M]oving away from
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In June 2016, a collection of financial industry advocacy groups,
spearheaded by the United States Chamber of Commerce, sued 101 the
DOL. 102 The groups cited many of the same reasons as the Republicans
on Capitol Hill, pointing to what they perceived to be the fiduciary rule’s
whittling away of the investment selections that would be available for
financial advisers to offer their clients and what would effectively be a
cloud of potential legal liability hanging over all future interactions
between advisers and clients. 103
This litigation culminated in the Fifth Circuit’s decision to vacate
the entire fiduciary rule in March 2018. 104 First, the court held that the
fiduciary rule conflicted with federal law, that the DOL misinterpreted
“investment advice fiduciary” to be ambiguous, 105 and that this
interpretation of fiduciary would disrupt the uniform application of the
word “fiduciary” through the ERISA law. 106 Second, the court held that
the policy argument for the need to modernize ERISA for the better
protection of today’s retirement investors was one that should be
addressed by Congress, not the executive branch. 107 Finally, the court
held that the fiduciary rule did not satisfy the requirements set forth by
the Chevron 108 doctrine. 109 Specifically, the court held that the fiduciary
rule violated step two of the doctrine, which requires courts to determine
“whether [or not] Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority
over a question to the agency asserting deference” regarding an
ambiguous portion(s) of a statute. 110 In pointing to the many
commissions would leave smaller investors without access to financial advice, since a
percentage fee on a small account would not justify an adviser’s time.”).
101. Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d
152 (N.D. Tex. 2017).
102. Monica C. Meinert, Industry Groups Sue DOL over Fiduciary Rule, ABA BANKING
J. (June 2, 2016), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2016/06/industry-groups-sue-dol-overfiduciary-rule/ [https://perma.cc/B3KR-7PJE].
103. See id. (laying out the concerns of the financial industry and how the potential liability
could restrict interactions with consumers).
104. Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885
F.3d 360, 369 (5th Cir. 2018); Lisa Beilfuss, Fiduciary Rule Dealt Blow by Circuit Court
Ruling, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2018, 9:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fiduciary-ruledealt-blow-by-circuit-court-ruling-1521164915?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/8F32P63V].
105. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 885 F.3d at 369.
106. Id. at 376–78.
107. Id. at 378–79.
108. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (laying
out the test that has formed the foundation for the boundaries of administrative deference).
109. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 885 F.3d at 379–80.
110. Id. at 387.
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administrative flaws it perceived in the fiduciary rule, the court concluded
that the fiduciary rule possessed “hallmarks of ‘unreasonableness’ under
Chevron Step Two and [constituted] arbitrary and capricious exercises of
administrative power.” 111
Crucially for the financial industry, the court took aim at the
fiduciary rule’s portions that relate to legal liability on the part of advisers
and their financial institutions. 112 The court criticized the fiduciary rule
for its attempted creation of vehicles for private litigation through the BIC
Exemption contracts. 113 The court pointed to the need for Congress to
authorize a private right of action, which it did for ERISA-qualified
retirement plans through the enactment of ERISA itself but did not for
plans such as IRAs. 114 The elimination of the fiduciary rule set the stage
for the SEC to step in with its own solution to address the issue of
conflicted retirement advice. 115
IV. THE SEC BEST INTEREST PACKAGE
On June 5, 2019, the SEC formally announced that it had voted
in favor of a new package (“SEC package”) of investor protection
regulations. 116
A.

General Overview of SEC Package

The SEC package centers around the difference in regulatory
standards between a broker-dealer, governed under the Exchange Act, 117
and an investment adviser, governed under the Investment Advisers Act

111. Id. at 388.
112. See id. at 384 (“[T]he BICE provisions regarding lawsuits also violate the separation

of powers . . . .”).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Dave Michaels, Brokers Will Have to Reveal More to Investors Under Coming
SEC Rule, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15 2018, 1:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/brokers-willhave-to-reveal-more-to-investors-under-coming-sec-rule1521133534?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=1&mod=article_inline
[https://perma.cc/XYY7-4YYU] (speculating on the SEC’s plans for a new regulatory
framework to replace the fiduciary rule).
116. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules and Interpretations
to Enhance Protections and Preserve Choice for Retail Investors in Their Relationships with
Financial Professionals (June 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-89
[https://perma.cc/38VV-P8SR].
117. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2018).
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of 1940. 118 The SEC aims to assure the investor that he or she is receiving
information that is in the investor’s “best interest,” not in the financial
interests of the broker, adviser, or financial firm. 119 The SEC package
identifies the same problems that the fiduciary rule sought to eliminate:
inherent conflicts of interest in the financial advising process emanating
from the commission-based compensation structure. 120
However, in a sharp deviation from the view that the Obama
Administration held of the commission-based compensation structure, 121
under the direction of President Trump-appointed Chairman Jay Clayton,
the SEC sought a more balanced approach between the concerns of
investors and the financial advisory industry. 122 The SEC pointed to the
positive impacts that the commission-based compensation structure has
had on the industry, such as the typical example of the investor seeking
only a one-time investment and holding it for a number of years. 123 That
investor benefits from the commission structure because he or she saves
money through not having to pay fees on a balance that was not being
actively traded or managed. 124 Additionally, for many consumers with
small amounts of investable assets, the commission structure provides the
only possible access to investment advice because many fee-based

118. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2018).
119. See Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg.

33318, 33319 (July 12, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (requiring that “brokerdealers . . . [a]ct in the best interest of the retail customer at the time the recommendation is
made, without placing the financial or other interest of the broker-dealer ahead of the interests
of the retail customer . . . .”).
120. Id.
121. See Liz Skinner, Figuring out Fiduciary: Now Comes the Hard Part,
(May
9,
2016),
INVESTMENTNEWS
https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160509/FEATURE/160509939/the-dolfiduciary-rule-will-forever-change-financial-advice-and-the [https://perma.cc/5NHQ-D6GA]
(asserting that the fiduciary rule’s BIC Exemption, while not outright banning commissions,
would have forced the financial adviser to earn “reasonable” compensation only, in addition
to its other disclosure requirements; also that the sale of high-commission annuity products
was expected to decrease under the fiduciary rule).
122. See Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 33319 (“[T]he relationship between a broker-dealer and a customer has inherent conflicts
of interest, including those resulting from a transaction-based (e.g., commission)
compensation structure and other broker-dealer compensation . . . Notwithstanding these
inherent conflicts of interest in the broker-dealer-customer relationship, there is broad
acknowledgement of the benefits of, and support for, the continuing existence of the brokerdealer business model . . . .”).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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advisers 125 require a minimum amount to be invested before entering into
a professional advisory relationship. 126
B.

Component of the SEC Package

The SEC package centers on “Regulation Best Interest,” which
includes the regulation’s “General Obligation” for broker-dealers. 127 The
General Obligation requires four components: (1) a “Disclosure
Obligation,” (2) a “Care Obligation,” (3) a “Conflict of Interest
Obligation,” and (4) a “Compliance Obligation.” 128 The package also
contains “Form CRS,” 129 a new requirement defining relationships with
broker-dealers and investment advisers and their clients, along with two
new interpretations of the fiduciary duty. 130
1. Disclosure Obligation
The broker-dealer must disclose: its title as a broker-dealer in
dealings with a client, the scope of the broker-dealer’s relationship with
the client, the material costs and fees that the client will incur, and any
possible conflicts of interest that might come between the broker-dealer’s
acting in the client’s best interest. 131

125. In other words, the adviser gets paid a percentage of assets under management
(“AUM”) instead of receiving a commission on the purchase of an investment product. Roger
Wohlner, What You Need to Know About Fee-Only Financial Advisors, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/102014/feeonly-financial-advisers-whatyou-need-know.asp [https://perma.cc/X8W7-HV3C] (last updated Oct. 14, 2019).
126. See Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 33319 (“Retail customers with limited investment assets may benefit from broker-dealer
recommendations when they do not qualify for advisory accounts because they do not meet
the account minimums often imposed by investment advisers.”).
127. Id. at 33320.
128. Id.
129. Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendment to Form ADV, 84 Fed. Reg. 33492,
33492 (July 12, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 275, and 279).
130. Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers,
84 Fed. Reg. 33669, 33669 (July 12, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 276).
131. Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. at
33321.
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2. Care Obligation
The broker-dealer is required to use “reasonable diligence, care,
and skill when making a recommendation to a retail customer.” 132 The
risk and potential return of the recommended investment products must
be considered in light of the client’s investment objectives, along with
any other reasonable investment alternatives that could fit the client’s
needs. 133
3. Conflict of Interest Obligation
The broker-dealer “must establish, maintain, and enforce
reasonably designed written policies and procedures addressing conflicts
of interest associated with its recommendation to retail customers.” 134
This prong of the General Obligation harkens back to some of the chief
goals of the DOL fiduciary rule, as it requires disclosure of “sales
contests, sales quotas, bonuses, and non-cash compensation” 135 that
might sway broker-dealers to place their own financial interests above
those of the client seeking advice. 136
4. Compliance Obligation
The broker-dealer “must also establish, maintain, and enforce
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to achieve
compliance with Regulation Best Interest as a whole.” 137 This
component of the SEC package is designed to tie together adequate
compliance with all aspects of new rules, not just a selected few. 138

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (“[A] broker-dealer’s policies and procedures must address not only conflicts
of interest but also compliance with its Disclosure and Care Obligations under Regulation
Best Interest.”).
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Reaction to the SEC Package

The reaction to the SEC package has been a practical mirror
image of the reaction received by the fiduciary rule. 139 As the details of
the proposed SEC package became public, Senator Warren criticized the
proposal for what she perceived to be its failure to adequately shield
consumers from unscrupulous financial advisers. 140 She pointed to the
discrepancies between the package and the DOL fiduciary rule, such as
the package’s failure to definitively place broker-dealers under a
fiduciary standard. 141 Instead, the package places broker-dealers under a
vaguely defined “best interest standard.” 142 She advocated that the SEC
outright ban the types of incentives that she asserted were the “source” 143
of conflicted advice, such as competitions fostered by the financial
services companies among their broker-dealers. 144 Finally, she took issue
with the fact that, under the SEC package, there was no private right of
action supplied to investors to sue their broker-dealers. 145 In her view,
the legal remedies available to consumers—FINRA arbitration
proceedings or independent SEC enforcement—were not sufficient to
discourage broker-dealers from pushing the boundaries of appropriate
behavior with their investors. 146 These concerns are shared by consumer
and investor advocacy groups. 147
Conversely, several Republican members of Congress expressed
to Chairman Clayton their approval of the SEC’s collaboration with the
financial industry to protect investors from possible conflicts of interest
139. See Press Release, Bates Group, SEC Adopts Regulation Best Interest: Early
Reaction and Its Impact (June 13, 2019), https://www.batesgroup.com/news/sec-adoptsregulation-best-interest-early-reaction-and-its-impact
[https://perma.cc/H5UR-F3W9]
(stating the different reactions to the package, both from different advocacy groups and the
SEC Commissioners themselves).
140. Elizabeth A. Warren, Worried About Wall Street Conflicts? The SEC Isn’t,
BLOOMBERG: OPINION (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/201808-03/worried-about-wall-street-conflicts-the-sec-isn-t [https://perma.cc/JVA2-U9G8].
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Sarah O’Brien, SEC Adopts Rule to Protect Ordinary Investors, but Critics Say
It’s Too Lax, CNBC (June 5, 2019, 12:20 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/05/secadopts-rule-to-protect-ordinary-investors-critics-say-its-too-lax.html
[https://perma.cc/Q2LU-WTKR] (“The obligation to act in the best interests of the customer
in the regulation simply codifies the obligation to make recommendations that are ‘consistent
with the investor’s best interests.’”).
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while simultaneously maximizing the menu of investment options
advisers can offer. 148 Industry advocates such as the United States
Chamber of Commerce 149—the same group who headed the effort to
invalidate the fiduciary rule—also applauded the SEC package for its
balancing efforts. 150
There are efforts currently underway in Congress to block the
SEC from enforcing the new package of rules. 151 The House of
Representatives, acting on an amendment sponsored by Maxine Waters,
the Chairwoman of the House Financial Services Committee, voted to
prohibit the SEC from using congressionally appropriated funds to
enforce the new package. 152 While not expected to be signed into law by
the Trump Administration, the amendment signals the hostility to the
SEC package held by congressional Democrats and a view that might be
held by a future Democratic president with the ability to appoint his or
her desired commissioners to the SEC. 153 The amendment, in addition to
being opposed by all House Republicans—and even a few
Democrats 154—is criticized by the Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association (“SIFMA”) 155 as an unjustified attempt to halt the
148. See Members of Congress, Comment Letter on SEC’s Proposed Regulation Best
Interest (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-18/s70718-4201409172824.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RQL-3LM4] (“[W]e believe it is critical to maintain multiple
business models based on the needs and preferences of an investor over their lifetime.”).
149. See Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Comment Letter on
SEC’s Proposed Regulation Best Interest (May 16, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s707-18/s70718-5528937-185232.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7GN-NQM3] (pointing to the SEC
package’s preservation of “the transaction-based payment models for financial services that
better serve the needs of the consumers, especially those with small account balances” as a
positive aspect of the SEC package).
150. See O’Brien, supra note 147 (“Supporters of the rule say it will be an improvement
over current standards for brokers, which only require them to make sure an investment is
‘suitable’ for a client.”).
151. Sarah O’Brien, House Passes Bill That Would Block Enforcement of SEC Investor
Protection Rule, CNBC (June 26, 2019 3:59 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/26/housepasses-bill-blocking-enforcement-of-sec-investor-protection-rule.html
[https://perma.cc/UYA3-GANV].
152. Brian Croce, House Passes Amendment to Block Reg BI, but Senate Not Likely to
&
INVESTMENTS
(June
26,
2019,
3:53
PM),
Follow,
PENSIONS
https://www.pionline.com/legislation/house-passes-amendment-block-reg-bi-senate-notlikely-follow [https://perma.cc/2A3B-E9E4].
153. See id. (“[T]he amendment will not be signed into law and mainly serves as a
messaging piece.”).
154. H.R. 3351, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019).
155. SIFMA is described as “the leading trade association for broker-dealers, investment
banks, and asset managers operating in the U.S. and global capital markets.” About SIFMA,
SIFMA, https://www.sifma.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/6GGA-N2ZT] (last visited Feb. 7,
2020).
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implementation and enforcement of the SEC package. 156 SIFMA praised
the new package as “the most comprehensive enhancement of standard
of conduct rules governing broker-dealers since the enactment of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.” 157
Also, in September 2019, several states 158 and the District of
Columbia challenged 159 the SEC package as a violation of federal law160
and, as a result “arbitrary, capricious, [and] an abuse of discretion
. . . .” 161 Specifically, the lawsuit alleges that the SEC violated its
directions in the Dodd-Frank Act where it was instructed to do the
following:
harmonize the standards that apply to broker-dealers and
investment advisers . . . and [to provide] that ‘the
standard of conduct for all brokers, dealers, and
investment advisers, when providing personalized
investment advice about securities to retail customers . . .
shall be to act in the best interest of the customer without
regard to the financial or other interest of the broker,
dealer, or investment adviser providing the advice. 162
This litigation provides another example—just as the lawsuit 163
that challenged and eventually defeated the fiduciary rule—of the degree
to which the fight over how to address the issue of conflicted financial
advice has become so politicized and divisive. 164 The lawsuit, should it
156. Press Release, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n., Waters Amendment to Defund Reg
BI
Would
Undermine
Inv’r
Prot.
(June
25,
2019),
https://www.sifma.org/resources/news/waters-amendment-to-defund-reg-bi-wouldundermine-investor-protection/ [https://perma.cc/Z9MB-9LD8].
157. Id.
158. New York, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Mexico, and Oregon.
Dave Michaels, Seven States Sue SEC on Concern Broker Rule Is Weak, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
9, 2019, 11:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/seven-states-sue-sec-on-concern-brokerrule-is-weak-11568085859 [https://perma.cc/UVM5-WAK9].
159. State v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, No. cv-08365-VM (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2019).
160. See Dodd-Frank §§ 913 (g)(1)–(2), 124 Stat. 1828-29 (2010) (detailing the provisions
granting the SEC the authority to create matching standards of conduct for broker-dealers and
investment advisers).
161. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3–4, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
No. cv-08365-VM.
162. Id. at 2–3.
163. U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2018).
164. See Michaels, supra note 158 (looking at the current lawsuit against the SEC package
and the history of litigation surrounding investment advice).

262

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 24

succeed in its mission to void the SEC package, would have the effect of
returning the regulatory landscape in the financial advice industry to its
pre-fiduciary rule status after ten years of fighting in Washington, D.C. 165
Therefore, even if the SEC package has set the proper standards of care
for broker-dealers and investment advisers, the politicization of this issue
makes it unlikely that the SEC package will withstand the test of time. 166
V. STATE INVESTOR PROTECTION LAWS
In light of the uncertainty and legal limbo generated by the
fiduciary rule and SEC package, multiple states have taken it upon
themselves to enact legislation or regulations to address the issue of
conflicting retirement advice. 167 Each state that elects to implement its
own investor protection laws and regulations must ensure that the
policies are not preempted by federal legislation, either expressly or
implicitly. 168 Legal challenges could arise to state investor protection
laws on the grounds that the National Securities Market Improvement Act
(“NSMIA”) 169 expressly preempts these types of state policies. 170 The
SEC package could also be construed to implicitly preempt any new state
policies that aim to achieve the same goals that the SEC package was
meant to tackle. 171
Four states in particular have advanced, in varying stages,
legislation or regulation to attempt to fill the void left by the vacation of
the DOL fiduciary rule: New Jersey, Massachusetts, Nevada, and New

165. See generally Makini Brice, Seven U.S. States, District of Columbia Sue to Block SEC
Rule Change, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2019, 10:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usasec-bestinterest/seven-u-s-states-district-of-columbia-sue-to-block-sec-rule-changeidUSKCN1VV04T [https://perma.cc/XR6T-JYUW] (describing the lawsuit challenging the
SEC package).
166. See Croce, supra note 152 (foreshadowing a potential attempt to alter the SEC
package should the presidency return to Democratic control).
167. See The Pros and Cons of State Fiduciary Rules, INVESTMENTNEWS (June 22, 2019,
6:00 AM), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20190622/FREE/190629990/the-prosand-cons-of-state-fiduciary-rules [https://perma.cc/6CML-QJQF] (discussing the potential
coexistence of federal and state investor protection rules).
168. DAVID C. BOCH & JASON S. PINNEY, MORGAN LEWIS, SIFMA REGULATION BEST
INTEREST SEMINAR 6–9, (July
10,
2019),
https://www.morganlewis.com//media/files/publication/presentation/seminar/2019/outline-for-panel-discussion-on-whatsnext-state-fiduciary-rules-and-preemption.ashx [https://perma.cc/27EL-7BRL].
169. National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat.
3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)).
170. BOCH & PINNEY, supra note 168, at 6–7.
171. Id.
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York. 172 The inception of these state laws and regulations that strongly
mirror the federal fiduciary rule has introduced several issues which the
financial advisory industry will have to address, besides the unanswered
question of possible preemption. 173 The following subsections detail
these individual efforts by states to strengthen investor protections, along
with the early reactions to these regulatory efforts.
A.

New Jersey

In April 2019, the state announced the implementation of a
“fiduciary duty” 174 that would apply to broker-dealers, investment
advisers, and investment adviser representatives. 175 The proposed
regulation, promulgated in response to the 2018 elimination of the DOL
fiduciary rule, requires an adviser acting as a fiduciary to not “subordinate
clients’ interests to its own,” to act with “loyalty and care,” and to “fully
disclose to its clients all material facts relating to the conflict [of interest,
if any].” 176
Industry advocates lobbied for the state regulations to be
suspended until the results of the new SEC rule are able to be quantified
and analyzed. 177 The industry advocates first assert that competing state
and federal regulations will only add to the confusion of both investors
and financial professionals. 178 They also raise the issue of investors’
172. See Ian Wenik, The States Setting up Their Own Fiduciary Rules, CITYWIRE (Mar.
13, 2019), https://citywireusa.com/registered-investment-advisor/news/the-states-setting-uptheir-own-fiduciary-rules/a1209414?i=8 [https://perma.cc/D9M5-SSWD] (listing the states
that have thus far implemented or announced laws and rules that pertain to investor protection
and the fiduciary status of financial advisers).
173. See James F. Jorden, INSIGHT: SEC ‘Best Interest’ Rule and Proposed State
Fiduciary Rules–Common Law and Preemption Tests, BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2019, 4:00
AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/insight-sec-best-interest-rule-andproposed-state-fiduciary-rules-common-law-and-preemption-tests [https://perma.cc/3GGL3HTC] (“Efforts by state regulators to adopt a sales conduct model based on the ‘fiduciary’
standards in the DOL’s rule would result in a patchwork of different standards (and different,
uncharted boundaries for conduct) that run afield of traditional common law definitions.”).
174. Fiduciary Duty of Broker-Dealers, Agents, Investment Advisers, and Investment
Adviser Representatives, 51 N.J.R. 493(a) (proposed Apr. 15, 2019).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Mark Schoeff Jr., New Jersey Fiduciary Rule: Pressure Leads to Public Hearing,
Comment Deadline Extension, INVESTMENTNEWS (July 17, 2019, 2:22 PM) [hereinafter
Schoeff
Jr.,
New
Jersey
Fiduciary
Rule],
https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20190617/FREE/190619935/new-jersey-fiduciaryrule-pressure-leads-to-public-hearing-comment [https://perma.cc/C2GU-ZFCR].
178. Id.
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moving from state to state as possibly providing yet another obstacle to
investors’ having a clear idea on the standard of care that is required of
the financial advisor they have chosen. 179 On the other hand, proponents
of the state rule point to the alleged failure of the SEC package to
adequately shield investors from conflicting investment advice and that
the state regulation will impose upon financial professionals the
necessary fiduciary standard. 180 The state argues that the SEC package
is not on par with regulations that impose a fiduciary duty and that the
new state rule can coexist with the SEC package. 181
B.

Massachusetts

In June 2019, the state proposed a “fiduciary conduct standard”
for all broker-dealers, agents, investment advisers, and investment
adviser representatives in their interactions with customers and clients. 182
The Massachusetts Secretary of State designed the standard so that the
state’s financial advisers would be required to act in “the best interest of
customers and clients, without regard to the interests of the broker-dealer,
advisory firm and its personnel.” 183 The Secretary based the new
standard on the “common law fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.” 184
The proposed regulation would apply to recommendations, advice, and
the selection of account types. 185
179. Bernice Napach, Brokerage Industry Blasts NJ Fiduciary Rule at Hearing,
(July
18,
2019,
3:49
PM),
THINKADVISOR
https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2019/07/18/brokerage-industry-blasts-nj-fiduciary-rule-athearing/ [https://perma.cc/DY88-JXN6] (describing some of the complaints of the financial
services industry over the proposed New Jersey rule, including one wealth advisor who said,
“If our advice and our services have to vary from state to state, it will be very confusing to
our clients and will require very substantial increased costs that they should not have to bear”
in protest of the propposal).
180. Schoeff Jr., New Jersey Fiduciary Rule, supra note 177.
181. Id.
182. Press Release, Sec’y of the Commonwealth of Mass., Preliminary Solicitation of
Public Comments: Fiduciary Conduct Standard for Broker-Dealers, Agents, Investment
Advisers,
and
Investment
Adviser
Representatives
(June
14,
2019),
https://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctfiduciaryconductstandard/fiduciaryconductstandardidx.ht
m [https://perma.cc/K4ED-2QLF].
183. Melanie Waddell, Galvin Proposes Fiduciary Rule in Massachusetts, THINKADVISOR
(June 14, 2019, 4:06 PM), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2019/06/14/galvin-proposesfiduciary-rule-in-massachusetts/ [https://perma.cc/AH3V-HEYY].
184. Id.; see Fiduciary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining the term to
mean a person holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to that of a trustee,
in respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good faith and candor
which it requires).
185. Press Release, Sec’y of the Commonwealth of Mass., supra note 182.
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The state asserted that the SEC package has failed to properly
define the term “best interest” and thus left investors exposed to the
potential pitfalls of conflicted investment advice. 186 Like the New Jersey
proposal, industry advocates such as SIFMA worry this proposal will
generate confusion both among investors over the standard of care to
which their adviser is held and among advisers over how to comply with
competing federal and state regulatory frameworks. 187 These concerns,
in addition to the added compliance cost, are the industry’s reasons for
requesting that the state hold off on implementing its own fiduciary rule
until the SEC package can be allowed to take effect. 188
C.

Nevada

In June 2017, then-Governor of Nevada Brian Sandoval signed a
mandate 189 that imposed on all Nevada financial planners a “duty of a
fiduciary toward a client.” 190 The law requires planners to disclose “any
gain the financial planner may receive, such as profit or commission, if
[the planner’s] advice is followed.” 191 Crucially, the law also grants
clients a right to sue financial planners who do any of the following: “(a)
violate[s] any element of his or her fiduciary duty; (b) was grossly
negligent in selecting the course of action advised, in light of all the
client’s circumstances known to the financial planner; or (c) violated any
law of [Nevada] in recommending the investment or service.” 192
In January 2019, the Nevada Secretary of State announced
proposed regulations to implement the 2017 law. 193 The proposed
regulations impose a fiduciary duty on all broker-dealers or sales
186. Id.
187. See Press Release, SIFMA, Comments on Massachusetts Fiduciary Rule Proposal

(July 26, 2019), https://www.sifma.org/resources/news/sifma-comments-on-massachusettsfiduciary-rule-proposal/ [https://perma.cc/JD76-57G3] (“We believe that once Reg BI is fully
operational and the SEC, FINRA and state regulators begin examining for compliance, the
Division will find that Massachusetts investors are receiving substantial additional protections
while continuing to have access to the numerous choices and opportunities they have today.”).
188. Id.
189. Andrew Hartnett, Nevada Imposes Statutory Fiduciary Duty on Broker Dealers,
GREENSFELDER,
HEMKER
&
GALE,
P.C.
(June
2017),
https://www.greensfelder.com/newsroom-publications-Nevada-imposes-statutory-fiduciaryduty-on-broker-dealers.html [https://perma.cc/EFJ4-S7X5].
190. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 628A.020 (2018).
191. Id.
192. § 628A.030.
193. Press Release, Sec’y of State of the State of Nev., Notice of Draft Regulations and
Request for Comment (Jan. 18, 2019), [https://perma.cc/2L3X-EZ6A].
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representatives who: “(a) provide investment advice; (b) perform
discretionary trading; (c) maintain assets under management; (d) act in a
fiduciary capacity towards the client; (e) disclose fees or gains; (f)
through the completion of any contract; and (g) through the term of
engagement of services.” 194 Broker-dealers and sales representatives
who engage in the following activities are exempted from an ongoing
fiduciary duty; rather, they owe the customer a fiduciary only relating to
the specific transaction at hand:
1. The broker-dealer does not manage client’s
assets;
2. The broker-dealer does not create periodic
financial plans for the client, provide ongoing
investment advice or enter into a contract to
provide investment advice;
3. The broker-dealer does not perform discretionary
trading for the client; and
4. The broker-dealer has not otherwise developed a
fiduciary duty with the client. 195
Multiple financial services firms oppose the proposed
regulations, saying that they will either be forced to stop offering retail
brokerage in the state or that investment options will be strictly limited. 196
The North American Securities Administrator Association
(“NASAA”), 197 an advocate for state securities regulators, has come out
on the other side of those financial services firms and groups like
SIFMA. 198 NASAA argues that the securities industry is able to handle
these complex changes in the regulatory environment and that state
regulation can coexist with the SEC package. 199 There is early evidence
that demonstrates the effectiveness that this type of proper, tailored
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Ian Wenik, Morgan Stanley Says It Could Leave Nevada over Fiduciary Law,

CITYWIRE
(Mar.
14,
2019),
https://citywireusa.com/registered-investmentadvisor/news/morgan-stanley-says-it-could-leave-nevada-over-fiduciary-law/a1210356
[https://perma.cc/LHA9-AYU7].
197. NASAA describes itself as “the voice of state securities agencies responsible for
efficient capital formation and grass-roots investor protection.” About Us, NASAA,
https://www.nasaa.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/K57P-29VA] (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).
198. Mark Schoeff Jr., State Securities Regulators Back Nevada’s Fiduciary Rule
Proposal,
INVESTMENTNEWS
(Mar.
7,
2019,
2:14
PM),
https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20190307/FREE/190309942/state-securitiesregulators-back-nevadas-fiduciary-rule-proposal [https://perma.cc/HYB4-M2TA].
199. Id.
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regulation can have on accomplishing the goal that federal and state
regulators have been aiming for: the protection of investors from
unethical and improper actions by investment advisers. 200
D.

New York

There are currently efforts underway in the New York legislature
to impose a fiduciary standard on all financial advisers operating within
the state’s borders. 201 The rationale behind the idea is similar to that of
New Jersey’s proposed investor protection laws: the SEC package does
not go far enough to shield investors from potential predatory
practices. 202 This follows the successful implementation of a state
regulation that required financial services professionals who advise on
insurance and annuity products act in the consumer’s best interests and
not allow external incentives to cloud their advice. 203
VI. CONCLUSION
One of the criticisms of Dodd-Frank was that it was far too broad
and that it instituted cumbersome restrictions on financial institutions that
were not equipped to deal with such regulation. 204 The main objection
was that the financial world is not a monolith in which all financial
institutions are created equal. 205 The same principle can be applied to the
200. See Lisa Beilfuss, When New Investor-Protection Rules Come Up Short, States Step
In, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 6, 2019, 10:09 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-new-investorprotection-rules-come-up-short-states-step-in-11567778985 [https://perma.cc/F8R4-MGSQ]
(describing how a Nevada investor requested her life savings be managed conservatively, the
broker-dealer’s choosing to place the money in a risky investment to generate higher returns,
and the investor’s use of the state’s fiduciary rule to take the broker and his firm to court).
201. See Mark Schoeff Jr., New York Lawmaker Works on Bill to Establish Fiduciary Duty
for Advisers in State, INVESTMENTNEWS (July 3, 2019, 1:05 PM),
https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20190703/FREE/190709974/new-york-lawmakerworks-on-bill-to-establish-fiduciary-duty-for
[https://perma.cc/8TVF-NNPZ]
(“[The
Assemblyman] is now crafting a bill that would impose a fiduciary standard on all advisers in
New York.”).
202. Id.
203. Mark Schoeff Jr., New York Issues Final Best-Interest Regulation for Annuity, Life
Insurance
Sales,
INVESTMENTNEWS
(July
18,
2018),
https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20180718/free/180719913/new-york-issues-finalbest-interest-regulation-for-annuity-life [https://perma.cc/22HE-AVWQ].
204. See Diego Zuluaga, Dodd-Frank Is in Trouble – and for Good Reason, CATO INST.
(Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/dodd-frank-trouble-goodreason [https://perma.cc/CAH4-5XA8] (criticizing the expansive reach of Dodd-Frank).
205. Id.
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financial advice industry, where there is a wide disparity in the amount
of advice consumers require, the types of financial advisers available, and
the methods in which advisers are compensated. 206 A tailored approach
to this problem of balancing the interests of investors and advisers alike
is the only way to ensure stability and fairness in the field. 207
A feasible approach is to dial back federal involvement in the
investment advice industry and allow states to experiment with different
levels of regulation to achieve the proper balance between investor
protection and giving financial advisers flexibility to serve their clients’
best interest. 208 As Justice Louis Brandeis famously wrote: “[A] state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” 209 Senator
Richard Shelby pointed to the success of state regulators in a 2004
hearing on the topic of conflicts of interest in the mutual funds industry:
Much of the Committee’s attention has been focused on
. . . the revelations of wrongdoing in the mutual fund
industry. These scandals had much in common: They
both involved egregious conflicts of interest, widespread
misconduct, and inadequate disclosure to investors.
There was another common theme underlying these
scandals: State securities regulators initiated both
investigations. Although the SEC is the primary securities
market regulator, time and again we have seen the need
for vigorous State regulators to pursue investigations and
enforcement actions . . . State regulators are the local
cops on the beat, and their proximity to investors enables
them to serve as an early detection system for growing
frauds and scams . . . Many states have proactively
206. See Dock David Treece, Fiduciary Financial Advisor: What It Is, Duties &
Obligations, FITSMALLBUSINESS.COM (Oct. 18, 2018), https://fitsmallbusiness.com/fiduciaryfinancial-advisor/ [https://perma.cc/6S7K-S2VG] (providing information on the wide array
of choices available in the financial advisory industry and how to decide which one(s) to use).
207. See Oxford Economics: DOL Fiduciary Rule Price Tag $3.9 Billion for Independent
SERVS.
INST.
(Aug.
18,
2015),
Financial
Services
Firms,
FIN.
https://financialservices.org/contentid5867/ [https://perma.cc/55J9-FY29] (describing the
burdens of compliance with the fiduciary rule on independent financial services firms).
208. See The Role of State Securities Regulators in Protecting Investors: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Hearing]
(analyzing the importance and success of state securities regulators in pursuing investigations
and enforcement actions).
209. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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launched initiatives designed to preempt future frauds by
educating investors as to how they can protect their assets
and to identify signs of wrongdoing . . . . 210
The debate over investor protection, should it keep festering in
Washington D.C., could make it highly politicized like immigration 211
and health care law. 212 Evidence of a partisan divide over how to properly
regulate financial advisers has become apparent over the past decade,
from the successful lawsuit 213 against the fiduciary rule, championed by
pro-business groups, to the current litigation 214 challenging the SEC
package, spearheaded by eight Democratic Attorneys General. 215
In addition to the SEC package, state laws and regulations, and
current litigation, there is also the possibility that the DOL will come out
with new regulations that deal with the standards of conduct that relate to
retirement accounts. 216 The financial advisory industry has undergone a
period of massive change along with rest of the financial and banking
systems since Dodd-Frank was enacted in 2010. 217 Allowing states like
Nevada 218 to implement their own investor protection laws could lead to
one state’s striking the right balance between the interest of the financial
industry and investors, at which point the federal government could
attempt to model its own relevant regulations after those states that have

210. Hearing, supra note 208 (opening statement of Sen. Richard C. Shelby, ThenChairman, S. Comm. On Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs).
211. See Zachary B. Wolf, CNN’s Poll Shows Why Immigration Is Impossible to Solve,
CNN (July 3, 2019, 12:35 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/03/politics/immigrationpoll/index.html [https://perma.cc/94QV-UA29] (detailing polling data showing a vast
ideological split among Americans regarding immigration policy).
212. See John Gramlich, Views of Health Care Law Break Sharply Along Partisan Lines,
PEW
RESEARCH
CTR.
(Oct.
27,
2016),
https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/10/27/health-care-law-partisan-divide/ [https://perma.cc/CP3P-SLZH] (detailing
differences between Democrats and Republicans over the state of the U.S. health care system).
213. U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2018).
214. State v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, No. cv-08365-VM (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2019).
215. Brian Anderson, Reg BI Lawsuit: 8 Attorneys General Sue SEC, 401K SPECIALIST
(Sept.
10,
2019),
https://401kspecialistmag.com/reg-bi-lawsuit-8-ags-sue-sec/
[https://perma.cc/MW46-5GJU].
216. Lori Konish, This Was Supposed to Be the Decade of Tougher Consumer Protections.
That
Didn’t
Happen,
CNBC
(Dec.
25
2019,
8:01
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/24/why-consumer-protections-didnt-improve-as-expectedin-the-2010s.html [https://perma.cc/V23X-WU5M].
217. Zuluaga, supra note 204.
218. See Beilfuss, supra note 200 (describing a Nevada investor’s successful use of the
state’s fiduciary rule after an adviser’s refusal to follow the investment request of the client).
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yielded positive reactions from industry and investor advocates. 219
CHASE PONDER *

219. See Paul L. Posner, State Laboratories and National Policy Reforms, GOVERNING
(Jan. 20, 2010, 3:00 AM), https://www.governing.com/columns/mgmt-insights/StateLaboratories-and-National.html [https://perma.cc/N7TF-L4RY] (pointing to the important
role that state governments play in our system of policy making and how the balance between
them and the federal government is of utmost importance).
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